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I. INTRODUCTION
We are now less dependent on locally available food resources that we
have ever been. The continuing industrialization of food production, the
advancement in technologies and the rapid development of supply chains
granted us the luxury of immediate access to a variety of products originating
from local supermarkets all over the world. ' This, along with the greater level
of food production industrialization, inevitably comes the rise of related food
safety risks. Because of the enlargement of producing operations, an emerging
safety threat in one place may result in a foodborne illness outbreak thousands
of miles away from its place of production.
Thus, the bovine spongiform encephalopathy (BSE) crisis of the mid-
1990s, more commonly known as a mad cow disease outbreak, led not only to
a sharp contraction in domestic demand for beef, but massive economic losses
throughout the UK and the entire European Union. Additionally, the outbreak
resulted in almost a complete loss of UK's export marketS2
In 2010, the U.S Center for Disease Control (CDC) reported that, during
the BSE crisis, more than 200 humans were affected by the disease and
separate cases were detected in more than 10 different countries.30r, consider
the spread of the E. coli virus across Germany in 2011. According to the World
Health Organization (WHO), the 2011 E. coli outbreak reportedly caused $1.3
billion in losses for farmers and industries and $236 US million in emergency
4
aid payments to more than 20 European Union Member States. In 2008, a no
less significant food safety incident occurred in China, where a nitrogen-rich
1. Dan Flynn, Imports and Exports: Americans Shop the World for Food Every
Day of the Week, FOOD SAFETY NEWS (Nov. 4, 2013),
http://www.foodsafetynews.coml2013/11/americans-dining-on-more-imported-food-
than-ever/, archived at http://perma.cc/63GK-VPNQ.




3. Variant Creutzfeldt-Jacob Disease, WORLD HEALTH Org., August 23, 2010,
hhtp://tinyurl.com/29zmmhl
4. World Health Day 2015: From farm to plate, make food safe, World Health
Org., http://www.who.int/mediacentre/news/releases/2015/food-safety/en/.
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chemical, known as melamine, was intentionally added to raw milk products in
order to increase the level of apparent protein content. The result was more
than 50,000 cases of hospitalization with kidney-related diseases in 45
countries across the globe.5
In a world of progressing globalization and constant growth in the
complexity of food production methods, local foodborne outbreaks are no
longer entirely local 6A small flaw in a food safety system in one part of the
world can cause significant financial loss and health problems in another. The
most recent WHO Report indicates that in 2010, 31 identified hazards linked to
food caused 600 million foodborne illnesses and 420,000 deaths globally.7
Additionally, as noted in the CDC's 2012 Annual Report, a vast majority of
those food outbreaks are associated with imported products. 9
Striving to reduce food safety risks, governments worldwide are trying to
develop more stringent and thorough standards, along with procedures intended
to ensure that their citizens are consuming safe food. The same standards and
technical regulations used to govern the admissibility of food into one
country's economy can be used as an effective protection to guarantee a
product's safety and quality. These same regulations can also raise the costs of
compliance with import/export procedures as well as create additional trade
barriers.10 Notwithstanding the similarities, compliance with one national
system's requirements will not necessarily confirm to be compliant with
5. Melamine Contamination in China, U.S(Jan 5, 2009),
http://www.fda.gov/NewsEvents/PublicHealthFocus/ucm79005.htm.
6. World Prone To Food-Borne Disease Outbreaks, Crry PRESS (Oct. 13, 2011,
7:14 AM),
http://www.citypress.co.za/news/world-prone-to-food-borne-disease-outbreaks-
20111013/,archived at http://perma.cc/YPW4-444K (quoting a World Health
Organization representative).
7. WHO estimates of the global burden of foodborne diseases: foodborne disease
burden epidemiology reference group, WORLD HEALTH ORG. (2007-2015),
http://apps.who.int/iris/bitstream/10665/199350/1/9789241565165_eng.pdf




9. Caroline Smith DeWaal, J.D., and Marcus Glassman, M.S, Outbreak Alert!
2014. A review offoodborne illness in America from 2002-2011. Center for science in
the public interest, http://cspinet.org/reports/outbreakalert2014.pdf.
10. Tom Vilsack, Removing Barriers to Agricultural Trade Ensures US Products
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another country's conditions." Not only do specific procedural details vary
significantly among the countries, but the general perception and evaluation of
food safety risks differs greatly.12 Such inconsistency in the food safety
policies both nationally and globally along can cause food safety outbreaks to
cross borders and affect dozens of countries at once. This demands further
international cooperation and more advanced information sharing and data
resources for export and import operations. Recognizing the deep
interconnection between international trade and food safety problems, countries
are now more actively attempting to address issues of sanitary and
phytosanitary control systems in their bilateral and regional trade agreements.
In February 2016, after seven years of negotiations between 12 countries,
including the US, Japan, Mexico and New Zealand, the Trans-Pacific
Partnership (TPP) Agreement was signed. The Transatlantic Trade and
Investment Partnership currently being negotiated between the European Union
(EU) and the US is another massive trade agreement that can significantly
affect the development of more harmonized food safety standards. However,
the question remains whether those agreements contain all the necessary legal
tools and will be effective in resolving discords in the food safety area. To fully
analyze the effectiveness of those trade deals, however, it's important to
understand what has already been done on the international level and what
regulatory areas need to be addressed first.
Therefore, this article analyzes the current state of international
governance of food safety and identifies its main weaknesses and strengths. In
particular, it explores how the recently adopted TPP and potential TTIP
Agreements can affect regulatory problems existing in the global food safety
system. The article is divided into three parts. Section II describes the main
differences in the United States' and European Union's approaches to food
safety issues by overviewing relevant regulations of GM foods and hormone
treatments in meat industry. Section III examines how existing international
institutions such as the World Trade Organization (WTO) and the World
Health Organization (WHO) manage food safety issues and their role in
international food safety governance. Finally, Section IV analyzes the proposed
and adopted sanitary and phytosanitary regulations in both the TTP and TTIP
Agreements. Additionally it identifies how the agreements address the most
debatable aspects of food safety and how current, similar agreements tend to
prioritize trade liberalization goals over food safety.
11. Alexia Brunet Marks, A New Governance Recipe for Food Safety Regulation, 47
Loy. U. CHI. L.J. 907, 918-919 (2016).
12. TIMOTHY L. SELLNOW, EFFECTIVE RISK COMMUNICATION A MESSAGE-
CENTERED APPROACH 154 (2009).
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II. MAIN BARRIERS ON THE WAY OF FOOD SAFETY STANDARDS
HARMONIZATION
A. Differences in EU and US Approaches to Food Safety Risk Assessment
The differences between how the EU and the US regulate food safety is
profound. Divergence between the EU and the US national food safety
standards are complex and come from the basic principles that their systems
are based upon.
For the EU, one of these principles is the precautionary principle, which
underlies most of its food safety regulations.'3This principle originated in
German domestic law, and emerged internationally at the 1987 London
Conference of the North Sea14 It was then included in the treaty that formed the
EU and is employed in both EU and European domestic law 5 The
precautionary approach is understood as the justification of preventive actioff
in case of scientific uncertainty with respect to possible health or
environmental impacts of particular product. This approach can be traced in
the EU regulations of GM products, novel foods 16and many other areas.
In contrast, the US leans towards a more liberal method of regulating
markets, preferring not to regulate production at all if it neither affects the
quality and/or characteristics of the end product.'7 The US approach is
generally characterized as cost-benefit oriented, where every food safety
regulation must undergo a careful analysis that the proposed act would not
cause unnecessary or unjustifiable economic costs.'8 Even after the passage of
Food Safety Modernization Act in 2011,'9 which aimed to shift the US food
13. European Parliament and Council Regulation 178/2002, Laying Down General
Principals and Requirements of




14. Michael Pollan, The Year in Ideas: A to Z; Precautionary Principle, N.Y.
TIMES, Dec. 9, 2001.
15. Treaty Establishing the European Community, arts. 130r-130t, Nov. 10, 1997,
1997 O.J. (C 340) 3, reprinted in 31 I.L.M. 253. See generally Theofanis Christoforou,
The Precautionary Principle in EC Law and the WTO Legal System, in THE
PRECAUTIONARY PRINCIPLE 99, 116 (Georges Kremlis, Yiorgos Balias &
Antonis Sifakis eds., 2004).
16. Maria Lee, Risk and Beyond: EU Regulation of Nanotechnology, 35 EUR. L.
REV. 799, 800, 816-18 (2010).
17. FDA Food Safety Modernization Act, Pub. L. No. 111-353, 124 Stat. 3885
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safety approach from reactive to preventive, there are still many fundamental
differences to overcome to establish common understanding with EU.
Currently, in the US, end-of-pipeline-solutions still continue to outweigh
preventive control policies, which are more common in the EU.
Even common points in the EU and US regulatory structures, such as
widespread employment of Hazard Analysis and Critical Controls Points
(HACCP) systems20 , the actual application varies greatly. For example, the EU
HACCP is accompanied by the traceability principle, which demands a high
level of documentation control from every member of the production chain
21
from manufacturing, to transportation to the retail of food products. On the
other hand, the US takes a market-oriented and less burdensome approach and
currently promotes expansion of its HACCP-based Inspection Models Project
(HIMP) pilot programs. This basically provides for the removal of government
inspectors from production facilities and relies on company employees to
perform many of their duties.22
1. Regulation of Genetically Engineered (GE) Products
It's safe to say that the regulation of genetically modified organisms is
one of the most controversial points in the food safety debate between the EU
and US. Each markets' approach differs in almost every aspect starting from
the authorization of cultivation of GMO crops to the labeling of GM food and
feed. The main building blocks that underline the US regulation of genetically
engineered products have remained unchanged for the last 30 years since the
adoption of the Coordinated Framework for the Regulation of Biotechnology.23
It was then when the key principle guiding the United States' approach to
genetically engineered produce was established. Significantly, it implied that
genetically engineered (GE) products should be regulated by their specific
characteristics, not by the way they were developed.2 4 Therefore, the whole
20. Development of Hazard Analysis Critical Control Points for the Food Industry;
Request for Comments; Advanced Notice of Proposed Rulemaking, 59 Fed. Reg.
39,888 (Aug. 4, 1994).
21. European Commission Health & Consumer Protection Directorate-General,
Implementation of Procedures Based on the HACCP Principles, and Facilitation of the
Implementation of the HACCP Principles in Certain Food Businesses,
http://ec.europa.eu/food/safety/docs/biosafetyfood-
hygiene legisguidancehaccpen.pdf.
22. See generally Pathogen Reduction; Hazard Analysis and Critical Control Point
(HACCP) Systems 61 Fed. Reg. 38806-01 (July 25, 1996).
23. See Emily Marden, Risk and Regulation: U.S. Regulatory Policy on Genetically
Modified Food andAgriculture, 44 B.C.L. Rev. 733, 734 (2003).
24. Id.
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process of production regulation was considered irrelevant so long as the
essential qualities of the end-product remained unaffected.25
Presuming there is no basis for differentiation between products produced
with and without biotechnology, guidance focuses on the concept of false and
misleading labeling. Therefore, the main concern of the regulation is not the
labeling of genetically engineered products, but the potential fraud and misuse
of information. This is basically the same approach exercised in relation to all
other labeling categories (organic, fair-trade, etc.) of produce. Thus,
bioengineered products can be labeled just like traditionally produced products,
unless there are some material differences related to one of the following
characteristics: special environmental or health implications (such as allergy
causing components); nutrient content; or organoleptic or functional
characteristics of the product26
Should a material difference be present, information about those.,
differences must be expressed on the label, so it will not be misleading. In
addition to those disclaimers, producers are free to voluntary label their
products as "genetically engineered" or as containing elements "that were
produced using biotechnology" .27 A new guide released for comments by the
US Food and Drug Administration (FDA) in November 2015, shows that not
much has changed in the FDA's perception of GE products since 1990s.2 8
According to the guide, genetically engineered crops have been widely used in
the US during the last 5 years and now often comprise a dominant part of the
nation's production.2 9 The guide also suggests there to be no basis for concern
as no health implications have been revealed over the years and, thus, those
products should be treated just as like the others. Though the FDA's guide is
only voluntary, it still indicates that the U.S. federal authorities continue to lean
towards a more market-ruled approach in the regulation of GE labeling.
However, a movement supporting mandatory GMO-labeling was initiated
in Vermont, Maine and Connecticut.30 These States are willing to enforce their
25. Id.
26. Guidance for Industry: Voluntary Labeling Indicating Whether Foods Have or






30. See George A. Kimbrell & Aurora L. Paulsen, The Constitutionality of State-
Mandated Labeling for Genetically Engineered Foods: A Definitive Defense, 39 VT. L.
REV. 301, 302 (2014).
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GMO-labeling laws should at least five more states adopt similar legislation.3 1
Some of the voices in support of mandatory GMO-labeling of food production
are also at the federal level. For example, in March 2016, USDA Secretary
Tom Vilsack made an official statement supporting the switch to mandatory
GM labeling regulation. 32 However, the regulatory framework at the moment
remains unchanged.
In the EU, the policy framework is built on a presumption opposite that of
the US's. Specifically, the EU concludes that, since there is not enough
scientific evidence as to whether GMO products are completely safe, the
precautionary principle must apply and use of GMO products must be strictly
limited and carefully controlled.33 The EU requires all food and feed products
containing, consisting, or produced from a GMO to be labeled unless the
presence is below 0.9% or if such an ingredient is adventitious or technically
unavoidable.34
Though the use of "GMO-free" labels is not prohibited, such labels must
not be used to mislead consumers. In addition to mandatory labeling
requirements, every imported GMO is subject to a special authorization
procedure, which is supposed to ensure that all health and environmental risks
are carefully assessed.35 Moreover, even after the product is imported and
cleared for market release, it still will be closely monitored with all possible
environmental effects assessed on an annual basis.
Recently, the EU made another significant move towards allowing
Member States to have more power to decide whether to allow genetically
modified (GM) crops in their territory.36 In March 2015, the European
31. See Stephen Tan & Brian Epley, Much Ado About Something: GE salmon bill
introduced, FOODDIVE (Mar. 7 2016), http://www.fooddive.com/news/vilsack-calls-
for-mandatory-gmo-labeling-ge-salmon-bill-introduced/415119/.
32. Carolyn Heneghan, Vilsack calls for mandatory GMO labeling; GE salmon bill
introduced, FOOD DIVE http://www.fooddive.com/news/vilsack-calls-for-mandatory-
gmo-labeling-ge-salmon-bill-introduced/415119/
33. Marden, supra note 25, at 735.
34. Traceability and labelling, EUROPEAN COMMISSION (Aug. 18, 2016),
http://ec.europa.eu/food/plant/gmo/traceabilitylabelling/indez n.htm.




36. See Elizabeth Whitman, European GMO Ban: Backlash Follows EU Proposal
to Let States Decide We=hether to Import Genetically Modified Produce,
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Parliament37 approved a new law that allowed Member States to restrict or
prohibit cultivation of GMOs even if such GMOs were already authorized for
market release in EU. 38 The only GM crop that has been currently authorized
for cultivation in the European Union is maize MON 810, developed by one of
the largest agricultural companies, Monsanto.39 According to Commission
spokesman Enrico Brivio to Reuters, by the beginning of October of last year,
19 EU Member States have already requested opt-outs for all or part of their
territory from cultivation of either Monsanto genetically-modified crop or other
eight GM crops that are still pending on approval for market release in EU. 40
There are, however, certain loopholes in the EU GMO legislation. Thus,
as it relates to labeling, products derived from animals feed with GM feed are
not subject to the labeling requirements, since only the food produced from
GM, but not with GM must be labeled.41 However, several countries in the EU
42
have already enacted voluntary labeling schemes to cover this gap.
2. Meat and Poultry Standards
Another area of difference in food safety standards between the US and
the EU is the decontamination and hormone treatment of meat and poultry
products.43 The predominant model of raising livestock in the US is
characterized by large-scale, high-throughput confinement operations with
herds or flocks that can range in size from hundreds to thousands of animals.44
In such conditions, once one animal gets sick, it does not take much time for
37. Majority of EU nations seek opt-out from growing GM crops,
http://www.reuters.com/article/eu-gmo-opt-out-idUSL6NOMO1F620151004.
38. Restrictions on Genetically Modified Organisms: European Union,
https://www.loc.gov.law/help/restrictions-on-gmos-eu.php.
39. EU changes rules on GM crop cultivation, http://www.bbc.com/news/world-
europe-30794256.
40. Majority ofEU nations seek opt-out from growing GM crops, available at:
http://www.reuters.com/article/eu-gmo-opt-out-idUSL6NOMO1F620151004







43. Renee Johnson, The US-EU Beef Hormone Dispute, Congressional Research
Service (2015),
https://www.fsis.usda.gov/fact-sheets/Slaugherinspection_101 /index.asp (last visited
Feb. 14, 2009).
44 Constance DH, Martinez F, Aboites G. The globalization of the poultry
industry: Tyson Foods and Pilgrim's Pride in Mexico. RES RURAL SOCIOL
DEV. 2010;16:59-75.
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the disease to spread to dozens of others. In order to prevent those situations,
the US allows the use of different antibiotics as well as post-slaughter
treatment procedures. 45In other words, the US authorizes slaughterhouses to
use decontamination treatments on carcasses on a massive scale4647Chemicals
like chlorine and peroxyacids are used to wash meat at the end of the
production line.
Recent developments in the US legislation indicate that the US moving
towards expanding production capacities rather than scrutinizing food safety
standards. 48Thus, allowing HACCP-based inspection programs, such as
HIMP, 4 9 to be carried out at poultry plants by the producers themselves, only
increases the risks of non-objectivity. In addition, such programs shift
inspection duties from federal food safety inspectors to untrained employees.
Finally, the USDA recently proposed increasing maximum poultry line speeds,
which may worsen the situation given the negative aspects of large-scale
production, including a possible increase in injuries to poultry plant
employees.0
In contrast, no decontamination treatment has been approved for use on
poultry and meat products in EU; only water can be used in processing.
Instead, the EU uses a so-called "Farm to fork" approach 51that includes
preventive measures and controls throughout the food chain - biosecurity on
the farm, proper transportation conditions and good slaughter hygiene. The EU
presumes that, if producers comply with the well-defined requirements for food
safety at all stages of production, there should be no need for special
"decontamination treatment" during the final step.
45. FSIS, Production & Inspection: Fact Sheets: Slaughter Inspection 101, USDA,
http://www.fsis.usda.gov/fact-sheets/Slaughterinspection_10 /index.asp (last visited
Feb. 14, 2009) [hereinafter Slaughter Inspection 101].
46. Dina Fine Maron, Tyler JS Smith, Keeve E Nachman, Restrictions on
antimicrobial use in food animal production: an international regulatory and
economic survey, GLOBALIZATION AND HEALTH (2013),
https://globalizationandhelath.biomedcentral.com/arcitles/1 0. 186/1744-8603-9-48.
47. Id.
48. Structural Change in the U.S. Chicken and Turkey Slaughter, ECONOMIC
RESEARCH SERVICE,
hitp:// www.ers.us(.gov/Pu)blicatiois/AER787/ (last visited Feb. 14, 2009).




50. 9 C.F.R. 381.69 (2014).
51. Commission Green Paper on the General Principles of Food Law in the
European Union, COM (97) 176 (Apr. 30, 1997); Commission White Paper on Food
Safety, COM (1999) 719 (Jan. 12, 2000).
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Simply put, the EU believes that, from the public health and food safety
perspective, this preventive approach is unequal to the decontamination
treatment method. As an example, consider the European Food Safety
Authority (EFSA) study completed on the CampylobacteriosiS52, which can be
transferred not only from meat but from the environment and even live
chickens. The study reveals how important it is that animals remain healthy at
every stage of production. In fact, twice more cases (50% to 80%) are
attributable to illness transmitted from the live animals than from infection
caused by food products. 53The EFSA also recently recognized there to be no
evident negative health effects from the use of chlorine as an antimicrobial
rinse in poultry production.54 However, the EU's general prohibition on the use
of such pathogen reduction treatments for domestic producers, as well as the
import ban on such products, remains in force.
Antimicrobial drugs for growth promotion are also widely used in US
meat production and growth promoters." While the use of antibiotics is
generally intended to make the meat safer by destroying potentially harmful
microbes and bacteria, it can also produce negative consequences.56 The FDA,
has confirmed that misuse and overuse of antibiotics can lead to loss of
antibiotic effectiveness and even cause the development of antibiotic resistance
both in animals and humans, thus posing a serious public health threat. A
number of researchers have also confirmedthat the use of antibiotics
promoting growth can even lead to an increase in antibiotic resistance.
52. Scientific Opinion on Campylobacter in broiler meat production: control
options and performance objectives and/ or targets at different stages of the food




54. Opinion of the Scientific Panel on food additives, flabourings, processing aids
and materials in contact with food (AFC) on a request from the Commission related to
Treatment of poultry carcasses with chlorine dioxide, acidified sodium chlorite,
trisodium phosphate and peroxyacids, EFSA JOURNAL 297, 20 (2005).
55. Guidance for Industry #209 The Judicious Use of Medically Important
Antimicrobial Drugs in Food-Producing Animals, FDA (2012).
56. Id.
57. Id.
58. H. Morgan Scott, Raghavendra Amachawadi, Issues ofAntimicrobial Resistance
in Pork Production, MEAT SCIENCE, http://www.meatscience.org/docs/default-
source/publications-resources/rmc/2015/15 scott f.pdfpsfvrsn=2
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One such drug, the use of which is highly debatable both in the US and
the EU, is ractopamine. Ractopamine is a veterinary drug, which is approved in
the US for use in animal feed as a growth promoter and is currently being used
in production of 60% to 80% of pigs. 60 The EU banned ractopamine's use in
1997 on grounds that there is not enough scientific data to clearly define safe
minimal residue levels (MRLs) of the drug for the human health.6 1 In 2012
Codex Alimentarius adopted MRLs for ractopamine, but the EU reaffirmed its
zero level policy.62
There is no direct scientific proof supporting the link between antibiotic
treatment of animals and appearance of antibiotic resistant bacteria in
humans.63 However, once again, exercising the precautionary approach due to
the lack of conclusive science, the EU prefers to limit and more strictly
regulate the use of growth promoting antibiotics in livestock production.
Chlorine treatment for poultry, just like ractopamine, is also not allowed in the
EU due to insufficient evidence as to its efficacy and the potential risks to
consumers' safety.64
B. Scientific Challenges and Driving Power of the Consumer Preferences
As can be evidenced from the GE and growth-antibiotic issues mentioned
above, the most debatable points among food safety regulations are those that
usually have no sound scientific basis beside them. Thus, in the case of
genetically modified foods and crops, there are no studies proving a direct link
to the negative health affects for humans. However, the main problem today -
as often argued by the EU - with the introduction of GE products on the
market, is not only the safety of GMOs for consumption, but their overall
impact on the environment.
The most commonly used genetically engineered crops are those that are
"Round-Up ready" (corn, soybeans and alfalfa). These products have been
genetically manipulated so they are immune to the pesticide chemical Round-
60. Ractopamine Factsheet, CENTER FOR FOOD SAFETY (Feb. 2013),
http://www.centerforfoodsafety.org/files/ractopaminefactsheet_02211 .pdf
61. EU Opposition to Maximum Residue Levels (MRLs) for Ractopamine in Codex,
CODEX, http://www.ait.org.
62. Alan Osborn, European Ministers Uphold EU Ractopamine, BAN GLOBAL
MEAT NEWS, (Oct. 25, 2012), http://globalmeatnews.com/content/view/print/693174.
63. Stuart B. Levy & Bonnie M. Marshally, Food Animals and Microbials: Impacts
on Human Health, CLINICAL MICROBIOLOGY REV. Oct. 2011 Vol. 24 no. 4 718-83),
http://cmr.asm.org/content/24/41718.full.
64. Hormones in Meat, EUROPA,
http://ec.europa.eu/food/safety/chemical safety/meat hormones/indexen.htm
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Up.65 Their improved characteristics allow producers to apply Round-Up
across their farmland and kill everything except for a particular crop. However,
such application of herbicides, even if not affecting physical characteristics of
the crop itself, can be damaging for the soil and animals that feed on the same
land or land nearby.
Moreover, as recent research developments show, some of the applied
herbicides can also have a negative impact on human health. This can be
recognized in the International Agency for Research on Cancer's (IARC)
66
evaluations on the carcinogenicity of glyphosate released in March of 2015.
Based on its evaluations, the IARC announced that glyphosate, one of the
world's most widely used herbicides, is probably carcinogenic to humans. 67In
addition to all the uncertainties and non-ending debates, science is rapidly
changing. For example, the way we used to move genes into plants using plant
pathogens is no longer considered an advanced method. Instead, with wider
application of CRISP-Cas9 technique, it can be done in a completely different
manner. No longer is it just about enhancing the qualities of crops, but GM;
animals are already on the market. For example, just a couple of month ago, the
FDA approved GE salmon for sales on the US territory.68
Moreover, debates surrounding food safety standards are often caused not
only by disagreement between different evaluations of scientific evidence, but
also by diverge cultural perceptions among different nations.69 Cultural
significance of food and how people evaluate food safety cannot be
underestimated. Consumer preferences and pressure coming from the demand
side has increased over the last couple of decades, motivating food producers
and retailers to develop various types of their own food safety standards and
labels.70
Counter movements exist both in US and EU. In fact, according to polls,
a vast majority of the US population, near 90% of all consumers, would prefer
65. Margie Kelly, Top 17 Genetically Modified Crops (Dec. 30, 2012),
https://huffington post.com/margiekelly/genetically-modified-foods-b-2039455.html.
66. Carcinogen City of Tetrachlorinephos, Parathion, Malathion, Diazinon, and
Glyphsate, (Mar. 20, 2014), http://d.doi.org/10/1016/S1470-20451570134-8.
67. Id.
68. FDA Has Determined that the AquaAdvantage Salmon is as Safe to Eat as Non-
Ge salmon, http://fda.gov/downloads/forconsumers/consumerupdates/ucm473578.pdf
(updated Nov. 2015).
69. Christopher Ansell & David Vogel, The Contested Governance of European
Food Safety, http://regulation.upf.edu/ecpr-05-papers/cansell.pdf.
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to see mandatory labeling of the packages of food that contain GMOs.7 2 One of
the biggest victories in the GMO-debate in the US can be contributed to the
power of public opinion. This was demonstrated in the defeat of the Safe and
Accurate Food Labeling Act of 2015, or so-called DARK (Deny Americans
Right to Know) Act. * If it would have been adopted, The Act would preempt
already enacted mandatory labeling regulations in Vermont and other states, as
well as block the possibility to adopt similar laws on the state level in the
future. Instead, the law would have established a general voluntary labeling
system mainly based on the usage of QR codes.74 As for the EU, in 2013, the
Chief Scientific Adviser to the president of the European Commission called
for the current usage of the precautionary principle to be "re-examined",
arguing that the principle should "enable innovation [and] not prevent
innovation from happening".75
III. ROLE OF THE WTO AGREEMENTS
A. Interrelation between WTO, WHO and Codex Alimentarius
One of the largest international platforms that established a level field
concerning trade and safety standards was established with the creation of the
World Trade Organization (WTO) in 1995. The Application of Sanitary and
Phytosanitary Measures (SPS) was adopted during Uruguay's round of
international trade negotiations and servers as a central piece in the WTO's
76safety standards system for the food imports and exports. As other
agreements in a "WTO package," the SPS supports the idea that every national
regulation implemented be in compliance with non-discrimination principle.
Thus, countries are not to treat products from importing countries any
72. Mary Ellen Kustin, 9 Out of 10 Americans Want GMO Labeling: Congress
Should Vote "No" on DARK Act, http://ecowatch.com/2015/07/23/gmo-labeling-dark-
act/
73. DARK Act defeated by Public Pressure, AMERICAN FREE PRESS (APR. 14, 2016),
http://americanfreepress.net/dark-act-defeated-by-public-pressure/
74. Victory! Latest Industry Effort to block GMO labeling defeated in Senate,
CENTER FOR FOOD SAFETY (MAR. 16, 2016), http://www.centerforfoodsafety.org/press-
releases/430 1/latest-industry-effort-to-block-gmo-food-labeling-defeated-in-senate#.
75. Phillippa Nuttall Jones, EU Chief Scientist Calls for Debate on Precautionary
principle, CHEMICAL WATCH, (Nov. 7, 2013), https://chemicalwatch.com/17157/eu-
chief-scientist-calls-for-debate-on-precautionary-principle
76. WTO Agreement Series: Sanitary and Phytosanitary Measures, WORLD TRADE
ORGANIZATION 3, 30 (2010),
http://www.wto.org/english/rese/bookspe/agrmntseries4_spse.pdf
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differently than those that are domestically produced. Likewise, no country is
to afford differential treatment to one foreign importer over the other. 7
Additionally, the SPS Agreement introduces three key principles: science
based risk assessment, equivalence and harmonization. In accordance with
article 3 of the SPS Agreement, sanitary or phytosanitary measures, guidelines
or recommendations established by an international standard-setting body, such
as the World Organization for Animal Health, International Plant Protection
Convention or the Codex Alimentarius Commission (Codex), are presumed to
be in conformance with WTO standards.78
Codex was established by the Food and Agriculture Organization (FAO)
and the World Health organization of the United Nations (WHO) decades
before the WTO. From the beginning, Codex's main purpose was developing
food safety standards and guidelines. However, all acts developed by Codex
are voluntary 79in nature. In fact, it wasn't until the SPS agreement mentioned
that compliance with the Codex standards can bring countries sound
justifications for their domestic regulations in possible trade disputes, when it
got wider application and became truly influential.
The WHO's role in the food safety standard-setting process is also highly
important. The WHO was the first established international organization with,
the primary goal of protecting public health by promoting the development of
higher health and safety standards.80 To achieve those goals, WHO is equipped
with relevant authoritative powers, including normative functions. ' Thus,
WHO can adopt conventions and agreements, regulations and non-binding
recommendations and standards.
However, since the enactment of the Framework Convention on Tobacco
Control (FCTC) in 200382, the WHO remains largely inactive when it comes to
the adoption of legally binding regulations. One of the steps in the food safety
area created under the WHO initiative is the International Food Safety
Authorities Network (INSOFAN), which was established shortly after the
77. Agreement on the Application of Sanitary and Phytosanitary Measures, UNTS,
art. 3.2, 493 (Apr.15, 1994), http://www.wto.org/english/docs-e/legal-e/15-sps.pdf,
archived at http://perma.cc/Y5VQ-83EZ.
78. Id.
79. UNDERSTANDING THE CODEX ALIMENTARIUS 13 (3d ed. 2006),
http://tinyurl.com/32hq9ly.
80. Charles Clift, The Role of the World Health Organization in the International
System, 14-15 (Centre on Global Health Security Working Paper No.1 2013).
81. Lawrence 0. Gostin, Devi Sridhar, & Daniel Hougendoiser, The Normative
Authority of the World Health Organization, PUB. HEALTH (Forthcoming),
www.elsevier.com/puhe).
82. WHO Framework Convention on Tobacco Control, WHO, (2005),
http://tinyurl.com/ylrjc9d.
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significant number of BSE outbreaks.3INSOFAN is supposed to serve mainly
as a platform for an information exchange between governments, allowing
them to react more promptly to food safety outbreaks and develop more
progressive, harmonized regulations in food safety.84 However, the non-
binding legal nature of its framework significantly weakens its effectiveness.85
Aside from the promotion of international standards, WTO's SPS
Agreement requires all national sanitary and phytosanitary regulations be based
on scientific principles and only utilized to the "extent necessary to protect
human, animal or plant life or health." Similarly, the SPS regulations are not
to be applied in a manner that would "arbitrarily or unjustifiably discriminate"
against other WTO member countries and would not constitute a "disguised
restriction on trade". 86 Along with those requirements, the SPS Agreement
provides just enough room for countries to preserve their individual levels of
health risk tolerance and control systems of food imports by demanding all
WTO members recognize and treat countries equally "even if such measures
differ from their own." Yet, at the same time, the SPS agreement seeks to
secure those countries the same level of protection that was deemed appropriate
87for the importing country. In all cases, the SPS provides that WTO Members
shall base their regulations on "sufficient scientific evidence", unless such
88sufficiency cannot be achieved at the moment. In such cases, countries can
adopt temporary SPS measures based on available information in accordance
with article 5.7 of the Agreement.89
Since the establishment of the WTO framework, dozens of disputes
concerned with food safety regulations were initiated by the Member States,
challenging different aspects of food production, marketing and inspection
procedures. Although the analysis of all relevant WTO case law is not a
primary goal of this article, review of the key disputes may shed light on how
effectively the WTO system has been working so far and what trends it created
as it relates to the progress in food safety standards harmonization.
B. WTO Disputes Related to Food Safety Regulations
83. Inauguration of the International Food Safety Authorities Network (INFOSAN),
WHO, (Oct. 12-14, 2004), http://tinyuri.com/2b3o6zf.
84. International Food Safety Authorities Network (INFOSAN), WHO (Oct. 2007),
http://www.who.int/foodsafety/fs management/infosan 1007_en.pdf
85. The WTO and the FAQ/WHO Codex Alimentarius, WORLD TRADE ORG., http://
www.wto.org/english/thewto e/cohere/wtocodexe.htm (last visited Nov. 8, 2014),
archived at http://perma.cc/V8SN-N8RS.
86. See SPS Agreement, supra note 77.
87. Id. at 30.
88. Id. at 28.
89. Id. at 31.
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Before considering existing WTO case law concerning food safety
standards, it's important to acknowledge, that while the SPS Agreement is
certainly the most important one in the field of food safety, it is not by any
means the only relevant WTO agreements. In fact, there are a great number of
labeling and dumping related WTO cases that concern food safety issues.9 0
Likewise, there have been a number of food safety related cases that have been
either withdrawn or resolved in the early, consultation stages. However, for the
purposes of this article, we will focus our analysis only on those cases that
were actually reviewed by the DSB and therefore include an interpretation of
WTO regulations as it concerns domestic food safety regulations.
1. EC-Hormones
91
In the mid-1980s, as a response to growing consumer concerns
European authorities introduced regulations limiting hormone use in livestoclk
production and began imposing import bans on meat products manufactured
with use of particular types of hormones.. Disputes, initiated by the US,
challenging European regulation became the test case for the SPS Agreement
and revealed a number of its weaknesses. 92The US's main argument against
the EU's regulations were based on the idea that the EU's ban lacked scientific
support. In other words, the US argued that the EU's whole effort is based
purely on protectionist interests and consumer resistance to the hormone use
rather than protection from real threats to human health.9 3
The EU acknowledged that there were no scientific studies supporting its
conclusion that the use of hormones can cause negative health effects.
However, it defended its efforts arguing its reliance on the "precautionary
principle" was aligned with what it had done in that past and that studies
showing no human health issues from hormones were not properly conducted,
thus required further research.94
Both the Panel and the Appellate Body, while relying on slightly different
reasoning, came to the same conclusion and held the EU ban lacked scientific
basis and could not be justified by invocation of precautionary principle, as it
90. Francis Snyder, We Need A Global Food Safety Agency: Reflections On The
Hidden Jurisprudence of the WTO, 2 PEKING UNiv. TRANSNAT'L L. REV. 162-209
(Sept. 2013), http://ssm.com/abstract=2247859.
91. Tim Josling, Donna Roberts, Ayesha Hassan, The Beef-Hormone Dispute and
its implications for trade policy, http://www.pf.uni-lj.si/media/beef.hormones l.pdf
92. Renee Johnson and Charles E. Hanrahan, The US.-EU Beef Hormone Dispute,
CONGRESSIONAL RESEARCH SERVICE, 1 (Dec. 6, 2010), available at
http://www.fas.org/sgp/crs/row/R40449.pdf.
93. Appellate Body, EC Measures Concerning Meat and Meat Products
(Hormones), 18, WTO. Doc. WT/DS26?AB/R (adopted Jan. 16, 1998).
94. Id; see also Johnson, supra note 92, at 1, 4.
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articulated in article 5.7 of SPS.95 As to the interpretation of article 5.7, in the
context of other international treaties, the Appellate Body considered the
analysis "unnecessary" and "probably imprudent", therefore withheld from
taking a stand on its status as it exists in the context of public international law.
96
While analyzing arguments of both sides, the Panel also produced a
number of important interpretations, clarifying the concept of "risk
assessment" in the SPS Agreement. Thus, it established a clear distinction
between "risk assessment" - which is a scientific examination - and "risk
management" - which is a process following right after the risk is already
established by the discovery of relative scientific evidence. Specifically, risk
management involves social value judgments as to what level of protection will
be deemed appropriate from a country's stand point, which can be as stringent
as a "zero" tolerance level.97
With respect to the EC-argument about insufficient scientific research, the
Panel also underlined that "theoretical uncertainty" is not the sort of risk that is
to be assessed under the SPS risk assessment requirement. DSB analysis also
uncovered a number of loopholes and revealed that the SPS provisions do not
clearly establish how scientific risk assessment should be conducted or how
results of such assessment should be evaluated.98
Thus, summarizing the WTO DSB approach to the risk assessment
evaluation under the SPS Agreement, it can be stated, that any WTO member is
allowed to establish a level of protection as it deemed appropriate during the
risk management stage. However, there must be an identifiable, and not only
theoretical, risk first. Another important distinction drawn by the AB in the
EC-Hormones case is one between the interpretive standard applied to Article
3.1 and Article 3.2. The standard in Article 3.1 requires that members base
their SPS measures on international standards, guidelines, or recommendations.
Meanwhile, the Article 3.2 standard provides that if a measure conforms to
international standards, it is presumed to be consistent with the SPS
Agreement.99
In EC-Hormones, the Appellate Body set forth a very strict definition of
Article 3.2's "conform to " phrase: it requires that an SPS measure "embody the
standard completely" or "match it exactly ". toArticle 3.1, on the other hand, is
a less rigorous threshold, permitting a measure to incorporate only some
elements of a standard in order to pass the "based on " test. Therefore, failure
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to meet the "based on " threshold in Article 3.1 would automatically result in a
failure to meet the more rigorous "conform to " threshold in Article 3.2.101
Aside from the legal interpretations presented by the DSB, it's just as
important how the parties manage the matter after the decision was issued.
Though this dispute resulted in the WTO supporting the US approach toward
the application of hormones in beef production, the EU has chosen to carry the
burden of retaliatory measures and continued with enforcement of prohibitive
regulations. In this regard, it's important to understand, that for the EU, the
question of antibiotic usage was never solely about possible implications of
hormone-treated meat on human health.
Thus, the "Collins Report," that was adopted by the European Parliament
in 1989, indicated that all veterinary medicine that will be used in the European
territory must comply with three pre-existing criteria, such as: 1) safety; 2)
quality; and 3) efficacy. It also called for consistency concerning the so-called
"fourth hurdle", which is 4) socioeconomic and environmental impact,
assessment.102This "fourth hurdle" criteria was developed with not only human..
health or consumer acceptance levels in mind, but also with recognition that all-
policies adopted at the EU level must promote the concept of animal welfare in,
agricultural production. 103Understanding the existence of such regulatory
background makes it clearer as to why the EU has chosen not to lift the
challenged ban.
2. EC-Biotech
EC-Biotech is another classic case, revealing two contrary approaches as
to what role science should play in determination of food safety standards. In
2003, the United States, Canada and Argentina brought a claim to the World
Trade Organization (WTO) challenging a set of the EU's regulations of
genetically modified (GM) foods.'" Between 1999 and 2003, the EU did not
authorize any GM foods pending on approval, since it believed a more
comprehensive analysis of possible human health risks and benefits must be
undertaken.105 Additionally, six individual Member States implemented
101. Id.
102. European Parliament, Committee on the Environment, Public Health and
Consumer Protection, "The USA's Refusal to comply with EC Legislation on
Slaughterhouses and Hormones and the Consequences of this Refusal", EP 128 381/B,
(Feb. 7, 1989)
103. Id.
104. Reports of the Panel, European Communities-Measures Affecting the
Approval and Marketing of Biotech Products, at 1, WT/DS291/R (U.S.), WT/DS292/R
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restrictions on certain GM foods that had already been approved by the EC.
Arguing that no sound scientific basis for imposing such bans on the
importation of GM foods existed, the US claimed that EU failure to approve
any GMOs during a five year period was a violation of the WTO SPS
Agreement and other import restrictions from Austria, France, Germany,
Greece, Italy, and Luxemburg.
In response to those claims, the EU argued that such regulations were
justified by environmental concerns and therefore shall not be assessed under
the SPS standards at all. As to non-compliance with SPS, the EU stated that
each ban fell under the Article 5.7 exception, which allows for temporary
precautionary measures when there is insufficient scientific information to
adequately assess the risks. Finally, the EC argued that because the measures
were based on some scientific knowledge, the requirements of Article 5.1 of
the SPS were also satisfied. The Panel, however, found that all EU regulations
reviewed in that case failed to satisfy the risk assessment requirements under
that Agreement, violating Articles 2.2 and 5.1 respectively.06
The Panel further found that because there was sufficient information
with which to assess risk, the temporary exception under Article 5.7 was not
applicable.107 The Panel narrowly defines an acceptable risk assessment,
following the requirements of the SPS Agreement. The Panel read the Article
5.7 exception as placing the burden on the EC to prove GM foods unsafe and
rejected the EC claims that risk assessments were not adequate in the face of
insufficient scientific data.08 It also failed to consider the EC's claims of
environmental safety brought under alternative Environmental treaties, such as
the Convention on Biological Diversity (CBD).
Once again, following the EC-Hormones approach, DSB in the EC-
Biotech case confirmed that, under the SPS provisions, precautionary measures
are understood in a stricter way, rather than how they were exercised in the
EU.10 9 In its assessment of the EU, arguments by both the Panel and the
Appellate Body followed the approach developed in two prior WTO disputes:
Japan-Apples and Japan-Varietals.o It was in the Japan-Apples case where the
Appellate Body drew an important distinction between the terms "scientific
uncertainty" and "insufficiency of scientific evidence", establishing that the
106. Id.
107. Lukasz Gruzcynski, Insufficiency of Scientific Evidence under Article 5.7 of the
SPS Agreement: Some Remarks on the Panel Report in the EC - Biotech Products
Case, 6 U. OTTAWA L. & TECH. J. 53, 78 (2009).
108. Id.
109. Reports of the Panel, supra note 104.
110. Id.
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text of Article 5.7 is clear and refers to "cases where relevant scientific
evidence is insufficient", not to "scientific uncertainty". I
The Japan-Apples case also clarified that the concept of "insufficiency" is
closely tide to the requirement of Article 5.1., which directs Members to
conduct a risk assessment. The two concepts of "uncertainty" and
"insufficiency" are
[T]hus not interchangeable and to be able to invoke protection under
112article 5.7 of the SPS Agreementl, WTO members need to demonstrate at
least some scientific evidence and the mere absence or controversy of scientific
studies that allow to conduct risk assessment cannot qualify as such.
In cases concerning EU regulation of GM products, European authorities
already conducted relevant assessment of risks and found that there were no
threats to human health.
Considering this fact, the Panel as well as Appellate Body rejected any
arguments about the need of additional scientific studies and concluded that-
scientific evidence cannot be recognized as insufficient and, thus, provisions of
article 5.7 SPS cannot be applied. Another important consistency that was,
revealed by the EC-Biotech case concerns non-compliance from the EU side.
3. US/Canada-Continued Suspension
The US/Canada-Continued Suspension case serves as a sequel to the EC-
Hormones dispute. A number of years after publication of the WTO decision
on regulations of hormone treated meat products, the EU conducted a number
of follow-up studies, striving to discover new scientific evidence that would
justify its prohibitive measures. 3However, the US and Canada promptly
challenged the continuing application of import bans before the WTO DSB.
Analyzing the issues at stake, the Appellate Body produced an important
finding, changing previous conclusions of DSB in EC-Biotech and EC-
Hormones cases. Among other things, the AB stated that the existence of an
international standard oes not necessarily preclude the operation of Article 5.7
of the SPS to those countries that choose a higher level of protection.
Thus, it recognized that a WTO Member who chooses to set a higher
level of protection may need to perform a completely different risk assessment
rather than the one that serves as a basis for an international standard. In doing
1 11. Id.
112. Panel Report, Japan - Measures Affecting the Importation of Apples,
WT/DS245/R, (adopted 10 December 2003), (upheld by Appellate Body Report),
WT/DS245/AB/R, DSR 2003:IX, 4481.
113. Panel Report, Canada - Continued Suspension of Obligations in the EC -
Hormones Dispute, WT/DS32 1/R, (circulated to WTO Members 31 March 2008).
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so, the WTO Member may find that relevant scientific evidence is insufficient.
Moreover, the AB confirmed that once well-accepted scientific evidence may
become insufficient over time in light of newly revealed facts that casts doubt
into the soundness of previous conclusions. 114
4. India - Agricultural Products
The WTO's India-Agricultural Products is one of the most recent
disputes, which touched on a great number of food safety issues.'15 It also
analyzed the relationship between the WTO and other international
organizations operating in that regulatory area, including the World
Organization for Animal Health (OIE). This case was initiated by the US who
challenged the Indian import ban imposed on poultry products due to the recent
outbreaks of avian influenza (AI) - otherwise known as 'bird flu'.116
The US challenged India's SPS regime for controlling AI, which banned
imports of ten (mostly poultry and egg) products if they were exported from
countries reporting certain types of Al. OIE established a notification system,
requiring all the participants to submit information about cases of Notifiable
Avian Influenza (NAI), including both highly pathogenic notifiable avian flu
(HPNAI) and low pathogenicity notifiable avian flu (LPNAI). India was
orienting on the data collected by the OIE and because the US had reported
incidences of LPNAI outbreaks, its exports were subject to the ban.
What radically differs in this case from so many others is that India has
chosen to argue that its regulations are in compliance with SPS provisions. In
contrast to the EU that usually invokes the precautionary principle as the main
argument justifying its measures, India in this case stated that its regulations
actually "conform to" the international standard, developed by the OIA and as
such must be presumed to be in compliance with SPS provisions."7 However,
as it was established in EC-Hormones case, "conform to" means that national
regulations are formulated and applied in a completely identical manner as the
relevant international standard. Thus, upholding the previously enacted
approach, the Panel in this case stated that complainant needed to present at
least some misalignments in challenging the regulations to be able to make its
case. The US, in turn, successfully presented a number of discrepancies
114. .Id.
115. Chad P. Brown & Jennifer A. Hillman, Bird Flu, the OIE, and National
Regulation: The WTO's India-Agricultural Products Dispute, WORLD TRADE REVIEW
15, 235-57 (2016).
116. Panel Report, India-Measures Concerning the Importation of Certain Agricultural
Products, WT/DS2430/P/R, (adopted 14 October 2014).
117. Id.
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between India's regulations and OIA standards, thus convincing the Panel to
rule in its favor. 118
The India-Agricultural Products dispute, thus, revealed two important
trends developing in the framework of WTO case law. First, it once again
confirmed that DSB continuously leans toward a more stringent and narrow
interpretation of the "conformity" test."9 Secondly, it underlined the
importance and growing influence of international standardizing
organizations.120 However, this fact was followed by the evolving public
policy concern revealed by a number of researchers.
Since the WTO put the OIE in the middle of a politically sensitive
commercial dispute between its members, it may have unintentionally
weakened the source of the OIE's strength that derives from its political
independence and ability to base its standards and policy on sound scientific
evidence. Similar political pressure has already confronted other standard-
setting international organizations such as Codex Alimentarius in light of the
EC- Hormones, EC-Approval, and Marketing of Biotech Products disputes.
C. Effectiveness of the WTO Dispute Settlement Body in Resolution of
Food Safety Related Cases
An overview of WTO case law demonstrates that, when it comes to the
assessment of domestic regulations in food safety, there are no easy answers.
This is particular true in light of the highly sensitive sovereign issues at stake
and the drastically different cultural perception of food regulations among
different nations. In cases where the violation of WTO rules is proven before
the WTO Dispute Settlement Body (DSB), respondents are required to bring
their regulations into conformity with WTO provisions, rather by modifying or
completely withdrawing their measures. However, the WTO is not equipped
with any tools to actually force a particular country to comply. Instead, it can
only authorize the opposing side a retaliation in case the non-compliance
continues. When the matter concerned is too tightly connected with country's
public health policies and basic principles on which such system is established,
countries are more likely to deviate from the DSB decision even if they will
lose. For example, it can be seen from the WTO case law analyzed above that
at the moment the EU approach to the precautionary principle is treated as an
unscientific tool at the WTO level. For the EU, however, it's an essential part
of how the science is understood. The EU's science is embedded in precaution
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comes as no surprise that the EU is often willing not to comply and instead pay
as opposed to changing its whole legal system.
Taking into account that WTO members are often more likely to non-
comply and pay-off rather than actually change the regulation, trade disputes
over food safety issues often only bring more costs and result in the creation of
additional trade barriers. Considering all the problems with a country's
unwillingness to comply, in addition to the fact that there no actual scientific
experts at the -WTO DSB to evaluate scientific basis of a particular claim, a
number a research scholars argue, that it would be more effective from a
regulatory stand-point for the Panel and the Appellate Body to focus more on
the evaluation of the ways in which particular regulation is applied rather than
on its substance. Such a deferential standard of review and analysis of the
discriminatory nature of measure application allows more space for WTO
Members to exercise its sovereignty as it relates to public health policy.
Similarly, it eliminates situations where countries are forced to choose between
removal of the measure and non-compliance. The reason for promotion of such
an approach can be drawn from the fact that the main idea standing behind the
WTO's regulatory instruments is not promotion of complete harmonization of
standards (including those related to food safety), but rather balancing of right
of the States to exercise their sovereignty in making policy choices and
expansion of free trade.
IV. ROLE OF THE REGIONAL AND BILETERAL TRADE
AGREEMENTS IN FOOD SAGETY STANDARDS HARMONIZATON
One of the most prominent trends in recent years is the growing number
of bilateral and regional trade agreements.121 Stagnation in WTO negotiations
and the growing pace of globalization has forced countries to establish a more
direct and stringent trade connections between each other. In comparison with
the international level, regional negotiation platforms have always been known
as more flexible and effective tools for establishment of harmonized trade
standards. Despite all the positive sides, however, there is a growing concern
among nations that harmonization of national food safety standards by means
of regional and mega-regional trade agreements may be going in the wrong
direction.
A. Trans-Pacific Partnership Agreement (TPP)
121. BERNARD HOEKMAN, SUPPLY CHAINS, MEGA-REGIONALS AND
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The most recently signed and widely discussed regional trade agreement
is the Trans-Pacific Partnership Agreement (TPP).12 2 This massive trade deal
brought together 12 countries, including the US, Australia, Brunei Darussalam,
Canada, Chile, Japan, Malaysia, Mexico, New Zealand, Peru, Singapore and
Vietnam and is primarily aimed at further liberalization of trade among the
signatures.123 The TPP also includes a massive block concerning sanitary and
phytosanitary regulations.124
Article 7.2b of the TPP states that its SPS chapter is "built upon" and
intended to "reinforce" standards that were established under the WTO SPS
Agreement.125 According to the Article 7.6c of the TPP: "Each Party shall
select a risk management option that is not more trade restrictive than
necessary to achieve the sanitary or phytosanitary objective, taking into
account technical and economic feasibility".126 Introduction of the "economic
feasibility" criteria directly projects the US's cost and benefit approach to food
safety regulations and provides for a significant loophole that would allow
disputing science-based, but not economically attractive, regulations. i
Thus, under the TPP, food safety standards that offer a greater level of
consumer protection than international standards, even if they conform to the
WTO food safety agreement, could potentially be judged as illegal trade
barriers. As to the definition of "scientific principles" and further explanation
of how different countries will develop more harmonized standards, the TPP
remains silent. Apparently, by saying that it will build upon the WTO SPS
Agreement, the TPP primarily pursues further progress in trade liberalization
rather than advance the level of food safety standards.
What is also interesting about the TPP's structure is that negotiators
decided to separate regulations concerning agricultural biotech products and
placed provisions on "Trade in Products of Modern Biotechnology" outside the
SPS Chapter. Apparently, the purpose of such a divide is to emphasize that
trade in products derived from biotechnology does not pose any health and
safety risks.
But what is the legal effect of such placement? The SPS Chapter imposes
certain requirements on Member States as it comes to the establishment of
particular definitions and test methods that need to be coordinated with SPS
122. Barbara H. Garavaglia, Sources of Information on the Trans-Pacific
Partnership, 95 MICH. B. J. 44 (May 2016).
123. Id.
124. Id.
125. The Trans-Pacific Partnership, Chapter 17: Sanitary and Phytosanitary
Measures 7-1, OFFICE OF THE UNITED STATES TRADE REPRESENTATIVE,
https://ustr.gov/sites/default/files/TTp-Final-Text-Sanitary-and-Phytosanitary-
Measures.pdf (last visited Oct. 5, 2016).
126. Id. at 7.8.
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"competent authorities".127 However, exclusion of the "modem biotechnology"
product from the SPS chapter would mean that all the aspects of those
products, even those that can potentially carry health risks,. will not be subject
to the SPS Chapter coordination requirements. As the preamble of the TPP SPS
Chapter directly indicates, its main objective is to "protect human, animal and
plant life or health in the territories of the Parties, while facilitating and
expanding trade by a variety of means to seek to address and resolve sanitary
and phytosanitary issues".1 28 Thus, the primary emphasis is put on trade
facilitation, when "protection of animal, plant and human health" is mentioned
like one of many factors that need to be considered and carefully managed
when it may limit the flow of trade.
In addition, the TPP agreement limits food import inspections "to what is
reasonable and necessary," and requires border inspectors to notify food
importers if a negative food safety check is issued.12 9 This measure, known as
the Rapid Response Mechanism, makes it much easier for importers to
promptly react and challenge import inspection requirements and, thus,
introduces additional constraints to space for domestic foods safety regulations.
Another significant change introduced by the TPP Agreement is the
establishment of the Investor State Dispute Settlement Mechanism (ISDS)
structures.30 According to the ISDS provisions, private companies that import
their produce can now directly challenge measures adopted by the foreign
governments and demand compensation for their loses, if such measures
violate TPP provisions.
One of the widely debatable concerns regarding the ISDS provisions, is
that a U.S.-owned food and agribusiness can now challenge domestic public
health laws they find unfavorable through their subsidiaries in TPP countries.
Moreover, there are a number of points that give rise to concerns about a lack
of transparency in such ISDS disputes. Thus, according to Article 7.9 of the
TPP on the kinds of scientific data used in risk assessments during the ISDS
procedures, bio-safety data can be withheld from the public and peer review by
corporate Confidential Business Information claims.
B. Transatlantic Trade and Investment Partnership Agreement (TTIP)
127. Id.
128. Id. at 7-2.
129. Id. at 7-10.
130. The Trans-Pacific Partnership: Upgrading & Improving Investor-State Dispute
Settlement, OFFICE OF THE UNITED STATES TRADE REPRESENTATIVE,
http://ustr.gov/sites/default/files/TPP-Upgrading-and-Improving-Investor-State-
Dispute-Settlement-Fact.pdf (last visited Oct. 5, 2016).
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The idea of negotiating an agreement that would ease the flow of goods
and services between the EU and US emerged long before the first version of
TTIP Agreement was drafted. Transatlantic investment and trade exchange
between the EU and US were, for years, making up "the largest and most
complex economic relationship in the world".1 'According to the statistics for
2013, the EU and US together account for nearly half of the world GDP and
each day trade in goods and services among those two countries amounts to
nearly $2.7 billion 32 Thus, it's no surprise that the first movement toward
creation of the common free trade began in 1990-s, when the first versions of
the Transatlantic Free Trade Agreement (TAFTA) were under discussion.
Despite the fact that TAFTA negotiations did not result in a conclusive
agreement, attempts to establish a common market did not stop. By the end of
2007, the EU and US agreed on the establishment of the Transatlantic
Economic Council, a body primarily purposed for promotion of economic
cooperation between two nations. Four years later, in the beginning of 2011,
both countries made another significant move towards further development of
economic relations, resulting in the creation of The United States-European
Union High Level Working Group on Jobs and Growth (HLWG), chaired by
the EU Trade Commissioner and the U.S. Trade Representative (USTR).' 33
However, it was not until the June 17, 2013, when the negotiations for the new
bilateral trade agreement between US and EU officially began. 134
The Transatlantic Trade and Investment Partnership Agreement (TTIP) is
supposed to cover a vast array of products and services regulations, furthering
reduction of tariffs in comparison to the levels already achieved through WTO
negotiations. The main focus of the Agreement, however, is the elimination of
non-tariff barriers, including key differences in current food safety standards1 35
The divergence in food safety regulatory standards between the US and EU, for
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PROGRAM 138 (2014).
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2013,
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decades, has been a complicated area full of constant debates. Nevertheless, the
goal of setting new food safety standards that would be more comparable is
commonly understood by both EU and US, the ways in which those standards
must be leveled and set up are envisioned in a completely different manner. For
example, while the U.S. Agricultural Secretary stated that the United States
might be unwilling to accept a TTIP agreement that allows Europe's current
restrictions on GMOs to stand, the EU nevertheless began strengthening its
regulations in this area, allowing Member States to prohibit cultivation of
GMOs already authorized on the EU level.
Announced intentions to resolve existing disagreements is highly
ambitions and based on the idea that the US and EU, in their TTIP
negotiations, will go beyond principles already established at the WTO to those
providing for a new level of food safety standards harmonization. However,
just like in every other case of standards harmonization, the unavoidable fear
that follows those discussions is lowering the food quality and levels of
affordable protection. As it relates to health and environmental standards, the
problem becomes even more sensitive since, as it was underlined in Chapter III
of this paper, health and food safety issues are highly interconnected with
sovereignty.
Just like the WTO's SPS Agreement and the TPP, the TTIP's main
purpose is to serve as a trade facilitation agreement, and not an agreement
specially designed for public health, plant protection or animal health and
welfare.136 As such, the TTIP is based on the presumption that the best
regulation is one that can be named as the "least trade restrictive."1 37 In January
2015, the European Commission published a draft version of the SPS Chapter,
introducing proposed regulations of food safety standards as well as animal and
plant health provisions. One of the proposed provisions dedicated to food
health and safety was the establishment of a special joint EU-US management
committee, which is supposed to be made up of trade and regulatory experts.
The committee will be a new body to filter all new food safety rules, with the
power to identify, prioritize and manage food safety issues, effectively
transferring power from national authorities to a committee of experts,
potentially including industry representatives. This transfer of power will mean
that the initial decisions will be in the hands of trade officials, not food safety
officials at the national level. The main concern from the EU side in this
136. European Heart Network, TTIP, International Trade and Cardiovascular Health-
A European Hearth Network Paper, (Feb. 2015),
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regard, is that this Committee can endanger future regulations aiming to
establish more stringent control of GMOs. Thus, any changes closing the
labeling gap for animal products produced with GM feed or other GMO cutting
edge technologies will be made after the TTIP is signed and can fall under the
requirement to be reviewed by the joint Committee, making their enactment
more difficult.
Another important provision of TTIP is one proposing to limit all "import
checks" to a number of "exceptional cases" in order to unburden the import
procedures and eliminate all the "redundant" import reinsertions.139 Thus, the
main responsibility for completing safety checks is supposed to be, in larger
part, on the exporting country.140 Thus, at present, instead of directly
establishing common food safety standards, combining positions of both
countries, the EU and US is trying to create a number of indirect legal tools
that would allow influencing either the development or implementation of,
future and already existing regulations.141
V. CONCLUSION
Finding a common ground in a regulatory framework for food safety is
one of the most challenging tasks that currently exist before international
community.142 Due to the sensitive nature and dedication to sovereignty, health
and food safety standards are not easy to negotiate. Differences in perception
among countries of the tolerance and risk of scientific evidence evaluation also
complicate the picture. At present, highly cautious consumers are also one of
the most important factors standing behind the formation of food safety
policies. Thus, many of the regulations adopted in the EU and US have later
been challenged as import bans, though were initially targeted at the domestic
producers and driven by domestic political pressure to set food safety standards
for consumption inside the country. As the history of WTO case law, and the
EC-Hormones case in particular, showed, establishing the primacy of science
over consumer fears can be a highly challenging task for national governments.
Currently developing regional trade agreements don't bring much clarity
and seem to treat food safety issues more like a trade barriers than an actual
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part of an agenda that needs to be discussed and developed. Both the TPP and
TTIP strive to minimize "trade restrictiveness" of existing domestic regulations
to the greatest extent possible by giving private companies more power to sue
foreign governments directly through ISDS mechanisms and establishing
limitations on "redundant" food import inspections, certifications and audits.14 3
No developments, however, are made with regard to finding a common ground
in risk evaluation procedures or scientific evidence assessment. Similarly, no
direct food safety standards are being negotiated. Thus, while the primary focus
of newly introduced trade agreements is the creation of indirect legal tools that
allow for the dispute of national regulations, most of the of innovative and truly
debatable food safety issues (such as regulation of growth hormones, food and
agricultural nanotechnology, endocrine disrupting chemicals, antimicrobial
resistance to antibiotics, and plant synthetic biology) remains unaddressed.
However, while economic and social benefits of trade are indisputable,
establishment of solid food safety standards must not be treated as an
incomputable goal with further liberalization and expansion of international
trade.
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